Saturday, June 25, 2022

I want to reinvest what I pulled out a month ago. What should I know about the current state of crypto?

I sold my Bitcoin and Eth (about 15kish) when market started to tank. I want to buy back by dialing in my dca amount.

What major events should I be aware about to help me determine how much?

I know celcius has ghosted everyone. I have read about a a large pool of margin calls reportedly expiring on Monday. Some billionaire (don’t recall name) also pulled loans against his massive Bitcoin reserves that could need to be covered soon, causing a margin call and flooding the market with Bitcoin.

Are there any other items I should be aware to help tweak how much to buy in over the next couple of months


[Sat, Jun 25 2022] TL;DR — Crypto news you missed in the last 24 hours on Reddit

r/Bitcoin

Nasdaq: Bitcoin Uses 50 Times Less Energy Than Traditional Banking

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Think bigger.

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Number of nodes has exploded the last few days, what is going on?

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r/ethereum

Vitalik Buterin Clarifies Ethereum Centralization Concerns Following Merger

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What's a good tool to create a network architecture diagram for a whitepaper?

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Latest Week in Ethereum News

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r/CryptoCurrency

Bitcoin Uses 50 Times Less Energy Than Traditional Banking, New Study Shows

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If 20 years from now they make a movie about Crypto, they would need to tone it down in order to be believable for audiences

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And just like that Harmony one to be Harmony Done!

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r/btc

recent suspicious chain of events involving CoinFlex, BCH, and FlexUSD. did $90M worth of BCH go missing?

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Please stop using centralized bridges to smartBCH for any amounts of money that you are not willing to lose entirely

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Coinbase to require (due to regulation) private information when sending money to off-platform wallets, making it impossible to keep the recipient anonymous (In the Netherlands)

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r/SatoshiStreetBets

SatoshiSwap Friday Update - 24th June 2022

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Bitcoin network power demand falls to 10.65GW as hash rate sees 14% drop

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I recall a few weeks ago when DEI depeged, with large amounts deposited as collateral on Screamdotsh which had hardcoded 1$ value for all stables. Would you say AAVE is facing similar complications because of Harmony?

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r/CryptoMarkets

Goldman Sachs might be raising $2B to buy Celsius Assets in case of Bankruptcy

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Ladies and gentlemen... The power of Polygon on Coinbase

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The market is in my favor. It's LONG time!

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r/CryptoCurrencies

Any crypto exchanges that offer EUR pairs with a reasonable amount of alts (save for Binance and Kraken)?

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place your bets, whos up next after harmony one?

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r/CoinBase

5 Ways You Can Make A Difference Joining Apollo

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Been trying to get some Coinbase Customer Service for over a year

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Coinbase Will Make Modifications To Comply With Netherlands Rules

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r/binance

Cristiano Ronaldo Joins With Binance For New NFT Era

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I want to use Binance as a US citizen

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Institutional Investors Get a New Platform on Binance

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r/Ripple

Garlinghouse: "If we lose our lawsuit with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we will leave the United States entirely.”

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06/25/22 [Join FlareXRP Discord] - discord.com/invite/FlareXRP

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r/litecoin

Litecoin is Best For Onchain Payments

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Create NFTs and Tokens With Litecoin OmniLite

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New Peer to Peer Zero Trust Exchange

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r/Monero

Elizabeth completes final milestone for ETH-XMR atomic swaps CCS proposal

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The MAGIC Monero Fund received an anonymous 50 XMR donation yesterday! Thank you kind person!

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I did it guys! Running full node behind a VPN

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r/Stellar

Listen In: Denelle Joins Bloomberg Businessweek to Chat Moneygram

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Phishing Emails for Fake Staking Services

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Which Stellar wallet(s) have MoneyGram feature?

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r/cardano

Dadaelus takes way too long

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Maybe this is a dumb question, but if not merely a coincidence, what factors might cause the run on the right to have a nearly identical (besides scale) pattern to the one in the left?

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My Wallet Security Concerns and Other questions.

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r/NFT

Meme made by me, sorry if done before

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What it's like to work in Web3:

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Tell me you didn't DYOR without telling me you didn't DYOR

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event rewards not distributed

Hi there, I won a couple lucky prizes in the Bitcoin prediction event. The rules state that rewards will be distributed 1 day after winning. From my 350 usdt only 100 usdt is actually in my account. Does any know how this works?


Celsius recent events, whats next?

Let me start of by saying I have funds on Celsius myself and the current events came as a shock to me.

Celsius has stopped withdrawals, transfers & trades for almost 2 weeks now.

  • Over the past days the STeth price is getting closer to 1:1 for ETH again.
  • The Celsius wallets are also increasing in value.
  • Price of bitcoin managed maintain previous bull-run top and 200Week MA.

Can we be optimistic, what is your take?


🚨 BIG BITCOIN CPI EVENT!!!! Live Bitcoin Analysis

https://cryptogemtokens.com/🚨-big-bitcoin-cpi-event-live-bitcoin-analysis-price-prediction-today-livestream/

The Collapse of Three Arrows Capital

By now you’ve probably heard of the collapse of the multi-billion-dollar VC firm Three Arrows Capital (3AC). For a fund that once held over $10 billion under management, nobody predicted its demise to happen so quickly. In this piece, we will break down what went wrong for 3AC and discuss its effect on the entire crypto market.

What Is 3AC?

Founded in 2012 by high school classmates Su Zhu and Kyle Davies, 3AC started small with around $1 million in capital as they worked out of an apartment together in San Francisco. Since that time, they grew to manage billions of dollars, but how did they get there?

For starters, they only managed their own money, rather than the money of others. This would make them more of a trading firm than a VC, as VCs manage the capital of other investors. 3AC was able to dominate trading in the bull and bear cycle, making lots of money by trading Bitcoin and Ethereum derivatives. In addition to becoming successful with trading, 3AC was also able to correctly predict the end of crypto winter around 2019, with Zhu predicting a quick growth curve the second the market flipped from bear to bull. Combine successful trading and timing the bottom, and 3AC profited tremendously.

In addition to their Bitcoin and Ethereum trades, 3AC was also able to gain access to some incredible cryptocurrency project seed rounds. Seed rounds are funding periods that are only accessible by the wealthiest investors, and often lead to buying assets at insanely cheap prices before the public has a chance to buy. The tradeoff with seed rounds is that investments are locked for periods of time (also known as vesting schedules). These vesting schedules are set up to help prevent quick selloffs from these investors who hold a large number of tokens. For example, a company may buy 1000 tokens at the price of $1, but by the time the token is available for public trading, the token is trading at $25. This would be an instant x25, where many would be tempted to sell. Vesting schedules would force this company to only be available to sell a portion of their 1000 tokens over periods of time rather than all at once (more on this later). By investing a multitude of seed rounds, 3AC was now additionally making insane money on these ground floor investments. As the community saw the success of 3AC, many investors started to feel comfortable giving them money to invest (turning them into a VC), while exchanges felt comfortable loaning out large sums of money.

What Went Wrong?

Many tend to see past success as a predictor of future success. Unfortunately for 3AC and those connected to them, that is not the case. 3AC experienced a storm of events that turned the once flourishing firm into a firm on the brink of insolvency.

The first of many blows can be traced back to the Luna Foundation. 3AC participated in a token purchase of Luna to help fund the Luna Foundation Guard who would then go on to buy Bitcoin with the money. This reserve was created to defend the peg of UST. As things played out, Luna and UST entered the dreaded “death spiral". 3AC had approximately $560 million invested in Luna, most of which was locked as part of the agreement with LFG. This forced 3AC to helplessly watch their investment crumble to less than $1000. Regardless of how big a company is, turning that sum of money into vapor will hurt business operations by also forcing the company to have much less cash on hand. Being illiquid poses a risk!

In addition to the Luna catastrophe, 3AC was also involved in another investment that would hurt them tremendously. In 2020 and 2021, 3AC was the largest holder of GBTC (Grayscale Bitcoin Trust). This trust held a large amount of Bitcoin, and it was largely considered the best option for institutions and the older generation to gain exposure to BTC in their 401ks and IRAs. When Grayscale was the main way for big money funds to gain exposure to BTC, GBTC traded at a high premium. This means that the value of the GBTC stock price was trading at a market capitalization that was higher than the market capitalization of the physical Bitcoin held by Grayscale. For example, GBTC could hold 100 bitcoins at $5. The value of the BTC on hand is $500. If GBTC was trading at a premium, the market cap of GBTC could be trading at $600, even though it only held $500. Once other BTC exposure alternatives rose, the GBTC premium fell because institutions could gain exposure through other trusts that offered lower management fees. This eventually flipped the premium to a discount. Here is why this caused a problem for 3AC.

Three Arrows Capital was partaking in a GBTC arbitrage trade. Arbitrage is the buying of an asset at a price, and then selling that same asset for a higher price. With Grayscale, they allow institutional investors to buy GBTC shares at a price directly correlated to the value of the physical bitcoin it held, even if GBTC was trading at a premium. Institutions would then have a 6-month lock-up period of their shares. Once the period ended, they were able to sell their shares at the premium that retail investors were paying.

For example, the price of the physical Bitcoin held by GBTC could correlate to GBTC being worth a “true” value of $20 a share. If Grayscale was trading at a 25% premium, the GBTC price on the open market would be $25 a share. Groups like 3AC could then buy a share for $20, wait 6 months, and then sell for $25. By repeating this process over and over they made a great deal of easy money. The problem is if the premium collapsed and flipped to a discount, the price on the open market would be less than $20. This meant the arbitrage trade was no longer feasible because all the shares bought at $20 could not be sold at a higher value. With the easy money pipeline running dry, 3AC was now in even more trouble. Surprisingly, only days prior to rumors of a collapse, 3AC was rumored to be pitching the idea of a new GBTC trade to potential investors in hopes that GBTC switched to a spot ETF. What may be even more surprising is as things stand now, 3AC no longer owns any GBTC. Could this be forced liquidation to pay off debt? Only time will tell.

On top of the Luna collapse and GBTC arbitrage ending, 3AC traded with leverage. Leverage rarely ends well for most, 3AC included. On top of using leverage, most positions were long (bets that prices will go up). In a bear market, leveraged longs are the fastest way to lose money. To use this level of leverage, 3AC borrowed money from some big lenders. An example of one of their loans is from the popular company known as Voyager. Voyager lent out 15,250 BTC and 350 million USDC, a value of approximately $660 million.

As of today, Voyager has been unable to contact 3AC to pay more collateral, and if requests are not met by June 27th, Voyager will be forced to liquidate the loan and seize what it can. Unfortunately for Voyager, they are not guaranteed a full return and could take a big loss. 3AC has taken loans out in varying sizes from other lenders like BlockFi, Genesis Trading, Bitmex, and Finblox. By most accounts, 3AC was getting liquidated left and right, often ghosting the lenders when they tried to get in contact.

What is the effect?

With the implosion of 3AC, there will be a lot to be learned for the future of the crypto market. Lessons were learned from previous monumental moments in crypto history, and the last few months will be a teaching moment for many. The first effect seen from 3AC is the ripple effect on those with close ties to the firm. These lenders either took on big losses or are still trying to recoup losses. With these large crypto entities paying the price of 3AC, they have fallen under financial stress and are in talks with bailouts from exchanges like FTX. Whenever bailouts are being discussed, it shows how bearish the market truly is.

With the cascading effect of 3AC liquidations, it is expected to see a large amount of sell pressure enter the markets. As mentioned earlier, projects allowed 3AC to become a ground-floor investor, with many of 3AC’s assets being locked in vesting schedules. With 3AC currently in a deep hole, it would not be surprising to see these assets sold the second they become unlocked. Also, if 3AC is unable to repay its debts, it could be expected to have those assets seized. Here are some of the assets 3AC invested in that are now intertwined in the whole situation.

Conclusion

In the end, 3AC acted in an irresponsible way, and many people are paying for it. 3AC confused past success with a feeling of invincibility. Once the wheels started to fall off due to the Luna crash and the easy money of GBTC arbitrage stopped, 3AC tried to dig themselves out of a hole only to make it deeper. For those who gave money to 3AC, they learned a valuable lesson in getting a better view into current operations prior to lending out large sums of money. In the future, many hope the transparency that blockchains allow can find its way into VCs like 3AC to prevent time bombs from lurking in the market. Crypto markets have always been volatile and will likely remain that way for some time. If VCs and exchanges are to operate in the long-term, they need to mitigate risk levels that are sustainable in bear markets, not only bull markets. The Luna crash is exposing the business operations of many high-value entities, with many being disappointed in what has been discovered. 3AC built itself up to be worth $10 billion at the height of the bull cycle, only to walk away with potentially nothing in the end.


Terra Luna Fiasco: 3 Lessons We Learnt

https://preview.redd.it/ca63ypwmmp791.png?width=700&format=png&auto=webp&s=1e4f261ef0346578ee369c4c31ab9eeb38747a92

The sudden rise of Terra to prominence was as spectacular as its collapse. No one saw it coming as LUNA — the platform’s native token — fell from an all-time high of nearly $119 USD to $0 USD within days, wiping out the entire savings of its investors. Last month, Mike Novogratz — CEO of Galaxy Digital — spoke for the first time, penning an open, warning letter to the crypto community.

Galaxy Digital — an investment management firm — alongside other “all-star roster” of venture capital (VC) firms such as Pantera Capital, Arrington Capital, and Lightspeed Ventures, to name a few, had backed Terraform Labs (TFL) to the tune of US$ 150 million back in July 2021.

Novogratz had such a strong belief in the project that he had a LUNA tattoo done some weeks before the implosion. The billionaire now says the tattoo is a constant reminder that VCs should undertake thorough due diligence before investing in a crypto-based project. As the crypto community continues to lament over the Terra fiasco — and understandably so — here are three important lessons that we can learn from it:

Algorithmic Stablecoins Are Inherently Fragile

Unlike other typical cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (BTC) or Ether (ETH) that have high volatility rates, stablecoins are pegged to more sturdy assets such as the U.S. dollar, gold, or commodities. They are designed to allow users to derive the benefits of paying with cryptocurrencies without the typical wild price swings that are associated with volatile virtual currencies.

The problem arises when the price drastically deviates from the peg. Under such circumstances, investors panic and there is essentially a run on the bank which sets the coin’s price on a downward spiral. This is what happened with Terra USD (UST). Unlike other stablecoins such as USD Coin (USDC) or Tether (USDT) that are pegged to cash and less risky assets, UST relied on a fragile algorithm and LUNA — a sister cryptocurrency — to maintain its price.

For every UST that the network minted, an equivalent of US$ 1 worth of LUNA was burned and vice versa. Whenever the UST price fell below US$ 1, users could burn it, essentially decreasing UST supply and theoretically pushing up the price to equilibrium. And whenever UST price surged past US$ 1, users could take advantage of it and mint more UST while burning LUNA. This would increase the UST supply and pull the price back to US$ 1.

An architectural design that UST/LUNA leveraged can only work when the cryptocurrency market is mostly up and investor confidence is high. In a bear market, this model cannot work. Once the stablecoin loses its peg to the US dollar, it sets in a vicious cycle with traders rushing to redeem their stablecoin for cash. This results in an increased supply of the stablecoin leading to a drop in price. This is what happened to UST which lost nearly 100% of its value in about 24 hours.

The problems that plagued UST are unique to algorithmic stablecoins, which differ from fiat-backed stablecoins such as USDC and USDT that have mostly worked so far. These coins are pegged to non-crypto assets which equate to the value of all the outstanding tokens. In the case of USDC, Grant Thornton — an accounting firm — reviews the USDC’s holdings every month to ensure that the peg is held while USDT’s reserves are reviewed by independent accountants.

Proof of Stake Has Weak Decentralization and Security Assumptions

The Terra network was essentially a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain that ran atop the Cosmos ecosystem and utilized Tendermint Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) for consensus. In a PoS-based network, consensus occurs in a two-round process where one validator proposes a block while other validators vote on it.

If the block receives a supermajority of votes, it is committed to the ledger and the validators are incentivized for their efforts with the validator that proposed the block earning more. However, to become a validator, you must stake more tokens in the network, and the more coins you lock in the system, the greater the chances of being chosen to propose and confirm blocks.

In the case of Terra, the consensus method used is called delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) where a few validators’ large concentration of staked LUNA tokens raises serious issues about decentralization and security. If a malicious actor were to enforce its rules over the network, it would only need to coerce a few validators.

Perhaps, this was one of Terra’s biggest architectural flaws, as Terraform Labs — the organization that created the network — held more than 50% of staked LUNA, with its founder holding a significant amount. Before the implosion, the network allowed only 130 validators — stakeholders with the most significant staked LUNA — to participate in the consensus process.

Under such an environment, a “51%” attack would be easy to launch since it only requires two-thirds of the staked LUNA. And if more than one-third of validators misbehave, it causes instability problems on the network. While DPoS is scalable, it has high barriers to entry which inhibits decentralization.

It is due to the inherent weaknesses with DPoS that pundits have been wondering whether Do Kwon — CEO and founder of Terra — had been forthright about his involvement in the fiasco. For example, were the DPoS validators the same ones that controlled the Bitcoin collateral? What happened to the US$ 3.5 billion in BTC that the company bought to steady the ship?

It has also emerged that Do Kwon closed Terraform Labs and liquidated two South Korean offices just a few days before the collapse of the network, further raising transparency issues about the network’s governance model.

Hub and Spoke Model Is the Best Blockchain Interoperation Strategy

The knock-on effect of the downfall of the Terra network was felt across the entire blockchain space because most protocols had integrated the protocol into their ecosystems. At the time, the projects that took the greatest hit were those hosted on the Blockchain, including Anchor Protocol (ANC), Mars Protocol (MARS), and Astroport (ASTRO).
All these protocols were decentralized finance (DeFi)-focused. As such, they had integrated heavily with UST as the primary stablecoin and LUNA as the major source of total value locked (TVL) on their smart contracts.
Being a Cosmos-based network, virtually all the assets in the entire Cosmos ecosystem were also hard hit by the collapse of UST. For example, Cosmos (ATOM), Osmosis (OSMO), and Kava (KAVA) rely on the inter-blockchain communication (IBC) protocol, and Tendermint BFT were affected due to their integration with Terra.
However, because of the Cosmos’s hub and spoke model, the cumulative effect of Terra’s collapse was not as dire as it could have been with point-to-point connections. In a hub and spoke model, message transfer and inter-blockchain communication occur via a hub. The hub allows the network to be cognizant of every transaction since it translates virtually everything into a canonical language. In case a particular blockchain fails, it can quickly be unplugged from the interoperable network.

What Analog Envisions for Web3 Ecosystem

The downfall of Terra is an epiphany moment in every sense of the word. While we empathize with investors that lost their investments, it also serves as a reminder that blockchains — and any other technology out there — that are not built on sound principles are bound to break at some time.

It is now time to pick up valuable life lessons from the Terra fiasco and build solid foundations for blockchain ecosystems. After all, learning is a continuous process and what does not kill you only makes you stronger! At Analog, we believe that blockchain provides a tremendous promise to unlocking opportunities in a digital era.

However, despite the promise, there are still significant challenges that we have to tackle such as a lack of interoperability framework, weak consensus protocols, and absence of privacy-preserving mechanisms. It is these challenges that have made the sector vulnerable to issues that have befallen the Terra network.

That is why we have a strong research and development (R&D) team that undertakes research activities on omnichain interoperability to help developers build a solid network, one that delivers cross-chain capabilities. The network we are building at Analog leverages a proof-of-time (PoT) consensus protocol — built from the ground up — to allow decentralized applications (dApps) to communicate seamlessly through validated event data.

By allowing current and new dApps to communicate frictionlessly across heterogenous blockchains, Analog unlocks a range of real-world use cases in decentralized finance (DeFi) and the metaverse.