Sunday, February 21, 2021

Planning for more events like $GME, Texas Snow and future pandemics

I've always kept my eye on this community since collapse is in the back of my mind 24/7. The two events that have made me go into full blown panic are $GME and the horrible conditions in Texas. I'm in the north east, young guy (just turned 22), not in good shape physically and mentally (working on it), thankfully working a decent job and living at home with my family.

Seeing everything that went down with $GME made me lose all my faith in our financial system that I already had so very little hope left in. Since then, I have been studying crypto endlessly and preparing to HODL Bitcoin and Ethereum to protect against the future collapse of fiat currencies.

After the snowy hell of Texas this past week+, I am trying to figure out how to prep my home for any disasters like of Texas. Moving somewhere else is not a real option for me so hunkering down is my only choice.

My pops and I bought a generator a while back and I am going to be testing it tomorrow to make sure its working properly. We have enough tools and supplies to mend anything in the house and to fortify the house if need be. We keep a small pantry of canned and dried foods in the basement and some frozen stuff in our other fridge as well. I definitely want to add more to that in the near future. Pantry contains mostly canned fish, dried beans and rice, flour, coffee, salt, sugar, a couple jugs of water that I always keep stocked and some frozen meats in the freezers that we cycle through frequently. We also have a little garden in the backyard for growing produce in the spring/summer. Its not a lot but its better than nothing.

I do have a emergency fund stocked up to pay bills in the event of losing my job for whatever reason. I am planning on liquidating more of my savings and transferring it to crypto once I have everything set up with that. My job is stable(ish?), in a booming but stressful field, and my managers are good to me - they let me do tons of overtime and let me do whatever I want so long as the work is done. It is a night shift position that I will never give up since its off hours so I miss a lot of traffic. Cops are the only thing that worry me since I'm a POC (ACAB btw).

I am not sure what else I can do to prepare. I am very nervous for the future and have no one to talk to about it. I never really planned for this sorta thing until right before the pandemic when I landed my current job (my 1st job post college). At the age of 22, I already have talked with my loved ones about what to do with me as well as my assets when I die.

The only thing that help me cope are reading my favorite mangas, eating good food while I can and just taking in the fleeting normalcy I have now. Just breathing the winter air at night while I'm outside on my break at work seems like a fleeting gift that will become a dream soon. Appreciating the little things definitely helps.


[WTS] The Only in Stock JSB Hand Pours

Verification

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65.37 g Bar - $70

40.73 g Bar - $45

39.00 g Bar - $43

46.03 g Bar - $50

2.57 ozt Hammered Round - $90 (this is one of The First Twenty just to clarify)

New Hand Pours

Honeycomb Heart Keychain - $25 each (a little over 1/3 ozt)

5 ozt Honeycomb Stacker Bar - $200

2.6 ozt Vault 76 Vault Door - $100

1.1 ozt Nuka Cola Cap - $52

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2.6 ozt Cast Kit Kat Bar - $100 each

Shipments on this sale will be USPS first class for $5 or priority for $8.

Payment by PPFF, Zelle, Venmo, Bitcoin, and ETH (Crypto Preferred!)

Prices are subject to change at any time due to market fluctuations and in the event of a listing error or update.


Splitting BCHA. How to Split BCH and BCHA after hardfork 2020 using official tool

More dramatization unfurls with Bitcoin Cash (BCH), fourteen days after a hard fork was completed, parting the first Bitcoin Cash into two forks, the first being Bitcoin Cash ABC (BCHA) and the second, Bitcoin Cash Node (BCHN). BCH's unique designers and group are important for the BCHA gathering.

Professing to be a gathering of "privileged excavators and whales", individualsfrozed their super larger part to change the organization's principles as a sign of dissent towrds BCHA's choice to found the "coinbase rule". The combative discussion can be followed back to September, where Bitcoin Cash designers (presently BCHA) chose to impose a 8% charge on diggers mining block awards on the organization, basically burdening excavators for the work they do.

BCHA expressed that the expenses would return to the engineers group and encourage their regular administration and future turn of events, yet this was obviously disagreeable with its local area, and even those outside of it. Some of them ventured forward to request the hard fork, where BCHN would remain its non-burdened form. A few crypto trades, for example, Binance have likewise voiced their help for BCHN to assume control over the BCH ticker name too.


Splitting BCHA. How to Split BCH and BCHA after hardfork 2020 using official tool

More dramatization unfurls with Bitcoin Cash (BCH), fourteen days after a hard fork was completed, parting the first Bitcoin Cash into two forks, the first being Bitcoin Cash ABC (BCHA) and the second, Bitcoin Cash Node (BCHN). BCH's unique designers and group are important for the BCHA gathering. Following a fruitful hard fork, BCHA ended up under a 51% assault by an unknown gathering ca

Professing to be a gathering of "privileged excavators and whales", individuals from utilized their super larger part to change the organization's principles as a sign of dissent towards BCHA's choice to found the "coinbase rule". The combative discussion can be followed back to September, where Bitcoin Cash designers (presently BCHA) chose to impose a 8% charge on diggers mining block awards on the organization, basically burdening excavators for the work they do.

BCHA expressed that the expenses would return to the engineers group and encourage their regular administration and future turn of events, yet this was obviously disagreeable with its local area, and even those outside of it. Some of them ventured forward to request the hard fork, where BCHN would remain its non-burdened form. A few crypto trades, for example, Binance have likewise voiced their help for BCHN to assume control over the BCH ticker name too.


Splitting BCHA. How to Split BCH and BCHA after hardfork 2020 using official tool

More dramatization unfurls with Bitcoin Cash (BCH), fourteen days after a hard fork was completed, parting the first Bitcoin Cash into two forks, the first being Bitcoin Cash ABC (BCHA) and the second, Bitcoin Cash Node (BCHN). BCH's unique designers and group are important for the BCHA gathering. Following a fruitful hard fork, BCHA ended up under a 51% assault by an unknown gathering ca

Professing to be a gathering of "privileged excavators and whales", individuals utilized their super larger part to change the organization's principles as a sign of dissent towards BCHA's choice to found the "coinbase rule". The combative discussion can be followed back to September, where Bitcoin Cash designers (presently BCHA) chose to impose a 8% charge on diggers mining block awards on the organization, basically burdening excavators for the work they do.

BCHA expressed that the expenses would return to the engineers group and encourage their regular administration and future turn of events, yet this was obviously disagreeable with its local area, and even those outside of it. Some of them ventured forward to request the hard fork, where BCHN would remain its non-burdened form. A few crypto trades, for example, Binance have likewise voiced their help for BCHN to assume control over the BCH ticker name too.


Crypto Holdings Etiquette - For Newcomers in Cryptocurrency

I am by no means a crypto OG. I wasn't in the space from the beginning but close enough. I've had my piece of success but that also came with a lot of trial and error, failure and many lessons learned. One of the biggest was dealing with exchanges which we all do on a regular basis. When things are going well, there's nothing to consider but the minute something goes awry, you'll quickly realize how little movement you have.

When you want to see true colours appear in any situation, experience a challenging time to get a handle on how well it's dealt with. Of course things are bright and rosy when all is going well.

I've had accounts on many exchanges and one by one, the number is dwindling. I never thought Binance would be one that ends up on the wrong side. They're highly regarded in the space and I liked the fact that Changpeng Zhao is a Canadian like me. But in hindsight, that means absolutely nothing now.

If you're a newcomer to crypto, I'm sure you have read posts like this before but for good reason, to safeguard your crypto. You and you alone are responsible for it. And here are some valuable tips to NEVER forget.

  1. DON'T LEAVE YOUR CRYPTO ON EXCHANGESIn the past, I've always been told this for the simple reason that an exchange can get hacked (MT GOX), exit scam (BITSANE) or collapse, fraud, whatever you want to call it (QUADRIGA). In any of these cases, had you been holding funds on there, likely consider it gone as thousands of users have. There are many cases like this, a simple Google will reveal that clearly. But in my personal experience, there's another reason. Customer support. Put simply, things go wrong easily. Incorrect addresses when transferring funds. FIAT wires not arriving. Login problems. I could go on and on. I've had my fair share and let me tell you, getting a resolution is NOT quick. We're talking weeks. This is nothing like calling your bank and getting to communicate with a live person. Exchanges don't have phone numbers and online support is usually a bot directing you to FAQ articles. Should you be lucky enough to get through a real person on online chat, they'll tell you to open a ticket with your issue. They're not able to help much other than answer common questions. My latest experience with Binance was exactly that. Waiting in queue of 400+ ahead of me, being kicked off twice for inactivity which totally didn't make sense as I was waiting for them, then 5 hours before finally getting a hold of them. Their answer about my issue was nothing different from what I already knew. Submit a ticket and wait 48 hours for a response. I'm expecting this to be a lot longer. To conclude, leave only what your trading. Stack your stash elsewhere.

  2. IF POSSIBLE, KEEP YOUR CRYPTO ON A HARDWARE WALLETI personally use Ledger Nano X. They support many different currencies and the list keeps growing. This in my opinion is by far the safest method and have been using it for years without any issue whatsoever. Choose the X version over the S if you hold many coins. It has a larger memory capability so it's well worth it for the extra money with much less wallet hassle.

  3. IF A HARDWARE WALLET DOESN'T SUPPORT YOUR COINIt's quite possible that your coin isn't supported. Maybe it's new, maybe it's not popular. Whatever the reason, there are still options to protect your funds. My first recommendation would be to use that coin's native wallet, most likely available on their website. This can take form as a desktop or mobile app. Just remember the vital information provided when setting it up, login, password with mnemonic phrase being super important. Follow the link for more info.

  4. OTHER WALLET OPTIONSThere are cloud wallets (METAMASK), software wallets (EXODUS) and paper wallets (MYCRYPTO) to name a few that are available. The key is to find a REPUTABLE one that supports your coin.

  5. KEEP YOUR INFORMATION SAFEAny option above comes with information that you NEED to protect. Logins. Passwords. Mnemonic Phrases. Falling into the wrong hands and you could lose any funds without a way to get it back. Remember, you are responsible for it and this is not something to take lightly. Make a paper copy of your information and store it somewhere safe, like a safe. Make another copy and store it in an entirely different safe location for backup. Some engrave it onto metal to keep it fireproof. Should something happen where you need to restore your wallet, not having the proper information will also result in a loss of your funds.

  6. AND LAST BUT CERTAINLY NOT LEAST?This is one most don't consider but anyone holding crypto should. What if something happened to you? What would happen to your holdings? Would they be gone because no one has the information you possess on accessing your crypto? It's not something that most like to think about but anything can happen. This can take forms in a few ways. Share your vital information with someone you TRUST. A family member, spouse or an extremely close person in your inner circle that would bail you out of jail in another country at 3am. If that makes you uncomfortable, it should. Anyone with that info would have the same access you have and could potentially wipe you out so choose WISELY. Another option would be to devise a system where a loved one would get access in the event something happens to you. Maybe the key to your safe that's left in your will with full instructions. Providing instruction would be a nice thing to do especially if this person hasn't the slightest clue about how complicated crypto can be.

Crypto veterans, if you have something to share about this, please do! It will only help the newcomers which we all were at some point.


A Detailed DD on Bit Digital (Formerly known as Golden Bull) (Nasdaq:BTBT)

Note: "Golden Bull Limited" changed their name to "Bit Digital" in September 2020. Again, "Golden Bull Limited" changed their company name to "Bit Digital" in September 2020.

The “JOBS” act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) was signed into law on April 5th, 2012 by the U.S. President Barack Obama. What is the "JOBS'' act? Well the "JOBS" act is a piece of american legislation that makes it easier for small businesses and companies to offer stock on american exchanges. The "JOBS'' act loosened regulations implemented by the SEC on companies and small businesses, such as lowering disclosure and reporting requirements if you’re a company that makes less than $1 billion in revenue. Essentially the goal of the "JOBS'' act was to make it easier for smaller companies to raise money and to allow "retail investors" to have the ability to invest in small businesses/ smaller startups. These small businesses/startups fell under a category called "emerging growth companies", which is a company that issues stock with a yearly revenue of less than $1 Billion. The "JOBS'' act loosened the reporting and oversight requirements for these "emerging growth companies". What I find most interesting about the "JOBS" act is the expansion of a rule called "Regulation A", which gave companies the ability to issue stock without having to go through the process of registering with the SEC. In the "JOBS '' act this rule was expanded, so companies can issue up to $50 million in stock annually without having to meet the regular SEC requirements. This was seen as a great thing because it opened up the opportunity for "retail investors'' to invest in "emerging growth companies". This opportunity would've only been available to "Accredited Investors'' had the "JOBS" act not been signed into law. But when you increase the chances for people to make money off investments, you also increase the chances for people to lose money off investments and now I want to segue to a company called Golden Bull Limited.

On March 20th, 2018, Golden Bull Limited filed their Prospectus with the SEC. In this, they announced an IPO of 1,550,000 shares at $4.00 a share. Also in this SEC Filing, they describe their business:

"We are an online finance marketplace, or “peer-to-peer” lending company, in China that provides borrowers access to short-term loans. The loans that we are currently arranging generally range from 30 days to 90 days, and are secured by borrowers’ automobiles. Through our online marketplace, we connect individual lenders with individual and small business borrowers. We currently conduct our business operations exclusively in China."

So they are a P2P money lending platform. They do not lend money to borrowers, they simply provide a marketplace to connect money lenders and borrowers. But what about if borrowers default on the loans lent to them by money lenders on the Golden Bull Limited platform? Well Golden Bull Limited said this:

"We currently facilitate loans exclusively to borrowers that provide an automobile as security to lenders..."

So Golden Bull Limited had the borrowers on their platform put up their car as collateral when receiving loans from money lenders. That sounds a bit too messy like how did Golden Bull Limited know the car wasn't stolen or recently been totaled or that borrowers weren't using stolen identities? These are some concerns i would’ve thought of when researching them but Golden Bull addresses this when they said,

"However, since none of the loans facilitated through our platform has defaulted to date, neither our collateralization standards nor our collection efforts have been tested in practice."

That sounds amazing. Considering Golden Bull Limited was in business for about 2.5 years up to the date of this statement ("From our inception in November 2015..."), no defaults on the loans of the borrowers who use their platform was a great sign and an enticing lure in their IPO. But one may raise some concerns about Golden Bull Limiteds' business model, such as what happens in the event of an economic crisis in China where money lending is decreased and borrowing demand is increased? (otherwise known as a credit crunch) What about the Chinese government potentially instituting tighter regulations on the practice of money lending? (this did eventually occur not long after their IPO) Considering China doesn't have a credit scoring system like the FICO system in the U.S., how do they know the probabilities of borrowers defaulting on loans? But all these concerns wouldn't even be addressing a big red flag with Golden Bull Limited. From the same SEC Filing (their Prospectus; links of my resources are down below in the comments), Golden Bull Limited discloses this:

"For the six months ended June 30, 2017, fees generated from loans provided to two borrowers accounted for 30.4% and 14.5% of our revenues, respectively."

So the most recent financial reporting given by Golden Bull up until their IPO on March 20th 2018, Golden Bull says that 45% of their total revenues came from the fees they collected from just two borrowers. So essentially two people who borrowed money on their platform (again, they didn’t borrow money from Golden Bull, Golden Bull simply was the middleman for the money lending and made revenue by collecting fees from each loan lent on their platform) contributed to 45% of their entire revenue. This revenue stream clearly wasn't sustainable, as these two borrowers could've left the Golden Bull platform for another platform, and Golden Bull would have their revenue nearly slashed in half (45%). So no surprise that Golden Bull Limited struggled to have a strong influence in the american stock market, but their share price never went below their IPO price of $4.00 until May 2019. From August 2019 to early April 2020, the stock of Golden Bull fell to as low as $0.28 a share and never went above $1.00 a share. If you see the chart of Golden Bull, you'll see that it had maintained a stock price movement between ~$3.00 and ~$10.00 a share over the course of early 2018 to mid 2019. But then they had a dramatic decrease in share price in August 2019 and the stock stayed below $1.00 a share for about another 8 months, with their all time low reaching $0.28. What was the catalyst for such sudden price movement downwards and the sustained low share price? Well...

On July 21st, 2019, Golden Bull Limited files a 6-k SEC Filing, in which they disclose this:

"Since May 2019, there have been a number of borrowers who borrowed funds via our online finance marketplace platform that maliciously defaulted on their debt repayment obligations (the “Defaulted Loans”)."

So the potential risks of the business model of Golden Bull came true and borrowers defaulted on their loans to the tune of "...(approximately USD13,500,000)".

That explains their stock plummeting in August 2019. But what was the reason for the stock staying under $1.00 for the next ~8 months? I’ll get to that later. But they also disclose something else in the same SEC Filing,

" ...we established Shanghai Youwang Vehicle Rental Limited...in order to start our car leasing business."

That's some positive news. Maybe Golden Bull can get into the car rental business after their p2p money lending platform just went up in flames.

"On July 1, 2019, the Chinese government implemented a new emission standard which requires vehicles to have better filtering systems. As such, our supplier may not be able to deliver the vehicles we purchased as previously scheduled. Management expects to launch the car leasing operations in the first quarter of 2020,. As of the date of this report, Shanghai Youwang has no substantive operations." (Date of SEC Filing: July 21st, 2019)

So essentially Golden Bull will not be making any sort of significant revenue until their car rental business launches in Q1 of 2020, which would've been about 5-7 months after the date of this SEC Filing (July 21st, 2019). So that perfectly explains the low share prices of Golden Bull from mid-2019 to mid 2020. But wait, there’s more.

In an 6-K SEC Filing Golden Bull filed on October 31st, 2019, they revealed that a Public Security Bureau (a government office in China that can be likened to a criminal law enforcement entity) in Shanghai finished their investigations into one of Golden Bull's subsidiary called "...Shanghai Dianniu Internet Finance Information Service Co., Ltd. (“Dianniu”)".

Dianniu was an arm of the Golden Bull company (Dianniu were in the business of “IoT”). In Golden Bulls' prospectus SEC Filing i discussed earlier it discloses 53% of Dianniu was owned by Xiaohui Liu (A top executive of Golden Bull), 21% owned by Zeng Erxin (the CEO of Golden Bull), 19% owned by Qian Lai Qian Wang Equity Investment Fund Management, and 7% owned by Huishi Equity Investment Fund Management. So these aforementioned entities, which consisted of the CEO (Erxin Zeng) and the Director (Xiaohui Liu) of Golden Bull, made up the owners of Dianniu. So now knowing the ownership structure of Dianniu, you'll understand that almost all of the management team of Golden Bull were charged with a criminal offense when a Public Security Bureau deemed Dianniu to have illegally collected public deposits.

"The Public Security Bureau has taken criminal enforcement measures against 17 suspects in this case, and have thus far detained 6 suspects. The Company’s management believes that the Company’s Chief Financial Officer, Jing Leng, and Director, Xiaohui Liu, as well as several members of Dianniu’s management may have been the subject of such criminal enforcement measures. The Public Security Bureau also has initiated online hunting for Mr. Erxin Zeng, CEO of the Company."

Essentially their entire executive and upper management team were suspected of committing acts illegal in the eyes of the Chinese law.

In an SEC Filing filed in November 2019, the new Management team of Golden Bull disclosed their intentions to enter into the crypto-mining business:

"The Company is planning to purchase bitcoin mining computers in December 2019 when funds are available."

But one hurdle Golden Bull would've had to get past was the fact that in April 2020, Golden Bull released their 2019 financial results. In this, Golden Bull reveals that they had less than $35,000 in cash and cash equivalents. If the new management team of Golden Bull purchased a significant amount of BTC-mining rigs in December 2019, that would severely impact Golden Bull financially as they ended 2019 with less than $35,000 in cash and cash equivalents.

So it's not looking great for Golden Bull. Their entire executive team was criminally charged by Chinese law enforcement or evading the capture of law enforcement. They now have to build up the company again from scratch. So what's their first order of business? Appoint a someone who they claim has expertise in the crypto/blockchain space to lead them into the crypto-mining space. Golden Bull appoints Mr. Huang as CFO (Chief Financial Officer) and gives him a seat on the board of directors. Mr. Huang is to be paid $60,000 annually and $100,000 annually for his employment of the aforementioned roles. Mr. Huang is said to have had expertise in the crypto space and has a good employment history in the financial/investment sector.

"Mr. Huang has served as the Co-Founder and Advisor of Long Soar Technology Limited since August 2019 and as the Founder/CEO of Bitotem Investment Management Limited since May 2018. From June 2016 to May 2018, Mr. Huang served as the Investment Manager of Guojin Capital. From August 2015 to May 2016, Mr. Huang served as an Analyst for Zhengshi Capital. Huang served as a Program Officer of Southwest Jiaotong University from February 2015 to August 2015. From March 2013 to November 2014, Mr. Huang served as the Engineering Analyst Team Leader of Crowncastle International. Mr. Huang received his bachelor’s degree in Environmental Engineering from Southwest Jiaotong University in 2011, and received his master’s degree in Civil & Environmental Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University in 2012."

So this seems like a step in the right direction for Golden Bull. So they have their CFO appointed, but what about their vacant CEO position?

Mr. Hu is appointed CEO and is to be paid $80,000 annually for his role as CEO and $100,000 annually for his role in being a part of the board of directors. What does Mr. Hu's employment history look like? Well... "Mr. Hu has served as the Business Manager of Weihua Liquor Company since 2011. From 2009 to 2011, Mr. Hu served as the General Manager of Xuejiawan Huafeng Wholesale Market Company. Mr. Hu served as a Manager of Eastern Hair Growth Center Company from 2002 to 2009. Mr. Hu received his bachelor’s degree in Law from Qingdao Qiushi College of Arts and Sciences in 2000."

Needless to say that is not an employment history of a CEO that instills confidence in me as a potential investor considering the company plans to move into the crypto-mining space. In the aftermath of the near self-destruction of Golden Bull, the Nasdaq halted trading of Golden Bull Limited stock. This was due to the mess of a company that Golden Bull was at that moment in time and was also due to the delay from Golden Bull in reporting their 2019 financial results. This Nasdaq trading halt wasn't lifted until April 2020, when Golden Bull released their 2019 financial results.

Despite all this, Golden Bull was still funding their crypto-mining operations. A quote from one article who discusses Golden Bull raises concerns about the future of their company: "...but only $35k in the bank as of 1/1/20 and no ability to generate cash flow with its car rental business (per today's filing), we are left to wonder how this business is being funded. I am also curious to know if the company has had any contact with the executives that were fired in October, the two people who own 58% of the company's stock."

In January 2021, J Capital Research issued a scathing report on Bit Digital (previously Golden Bull), where they allege that Bit Digital does not have the miners they claim they do and J Capital Research also allege that they spoke with the sellers of the mining rigs that Bit Digital claimed they bought their mining rigs from and they say that the sellers had never done any business with Bit Digital. There are a lot of other allegations made by J Capital in their report which i won't be getting into as they are currently only allegations. Bit Digital has refuted the allegations brought by J Capital Research and today I will stick to combing through SEC Filings and articles in my research of Bit Digital (formerly Golden Bull).

Bit Digital (formerly Golden Bull) has 40,865 miners and has mined 1,510.19 Bitcoin (According to their own website as of February 21st, 2021).

Summary of my research: The history of Bit Digital (formerly known as Golden Bull) is an interesting one and showed some of the same red flags that I have found in researching several companies that were similar to Golden Bull. Golden Bull Limited was a P2P Money lending platform operating in China that provided borrowers and money lenders with a marketplace to issue loans. Golden Bull Limited connected money lenders with borrowers, and made revenue by collecting fees off of the loans being transacted on their platform. Up until their IPO, Golden Bull disclosed that they did not have any users on their platform default on the loans they were lent. 45% of their total revenue from a six month period ending June 2017 came from the fees they collected from just two borrowers. (Note: China does not have a credit scoring system like the FICO scoring system in the U.S.) Golden Bull had their IPO in March of 2018 and had a stable share price movement up until August of 2019, when it was revealed that borrowers had started defaulting on their loans en masse. (Note: Golden Bull was not a money lender or a borrower. They were simply the platform in which money lenders and borrowers transacted. But when many borrowers on their platform start to default on their loans in a short amount of time, their revenue stream gets impacted severely as they make money off the fees of the loans being lent on their platform. Less revenue leads to a increased inability to cover operating expenses, which leads to more headwinds) The share price of Golden Bull plummeted to less than $1.00 a share and the company revealed even worse news in an SEC Filing filed by Golden Bull on October 31st, 2019 where they disclose that on the 24th of October 2019, a Chinese law enforcement agency had suspected all of Golden Bull upper management of illegally collecting public deposits through a subsidiary of Golden Bull called Dianniu. The CEO of Golden Bull Erxin Zeng, who had a 21% stake in Dianniu, had gone on the run and initially evaded the capture of the Chinese law enforcement agency. Money lenders who had their loans defaulted on by borrowers on the Golden Bull platform and couldn’t receive the collateral that borrowers supposedly were required to post (the collateral that borrowers were required to post was their car) sued Dianniu in an effort to get recover their defaulted loans. In the aftermath, all of the executives of Golden Bull were arrested and jailed for their involvement in the illegal activities of illegally collecting public deposits. Needing to fill the vacancies of the executive team, Golden Bull appointed a new CFO, who had experience in the finance/investing sector. But their appointment of the new CEO was not an inspiring one, as his employment history consisted of this:

“Mr. Hu has served as the Business Manager of Weihua Liquor Company since 2011. From 2009 to 2011, Mr. Hu served as the General Manager of Xuejiawan Huafeng Wholesale Market Company. Mr. Hu served as a Manager of Eastern Hair Growth Center Company from 2002 to 2009. Mr. Hu received his bachelor’s degree in Law from Qingdao Qiushi College of Arts and Sciences in 2000.”

When you consider that Golden Bull wanted to enter the crypto-mining space but their cash and cash equivalents on their balance sheet ending January 1st 2020 was $35,000, and they couldn’t generate any cash flow from their only proposed business (that being the car rental business) and their newly appointed CEO in November 2019 had no expertise in the cryptocurrency/blockchain space, then you’ll see the concerns i had/ still have as a potential investor in Bit Digital. In July 2020, Golden Bull “...completed the sale of 21,500,000 shares of common stock at $0.80 per share, for gross proceeds of $17,200,000.” So Bit Digital raised over $17,000,000 (which was used to finance their crypto-mining venture) by issuing more stock, which dilutes shareholders but its a better alternative than taking on debt to raise capital and issuing additional stock is a common occurrence among low-cap companies (Golden Bull changed their name in September 2020 to Bit Digital). When I look into a company, I try to delve deep into their past and Bit Digital's past is not pretty. But some recent developments in Bit Digital is that in early February the CEO of Bit Digital was removed by the board of directors (the same board that the CEO sat on), and a board member stepped down from their position in the board of directors. Here is a quote from an article announcing the news: “Bit Digital (BTBT), which has been battling allegations of fraud, said its board of directors has removed Min Hu as CEO. The bitcoin mining company also said Ping Liu resigned as chairwoman of the board due to “health reasons.”

Bit Digital is also facing a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. Southern District Court of New York on January 22nd, 2021, which “...allege the mining company made false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose the true extent of its mining operations, which it said had 22,869 bitcoin machines in China, per the filing.”

As of the making of this post, 2/21/21, Bit Digital says it has 40,865 Bitcoin miners which have mined 1,510.19 Bitcoin. I am not interested in delving into the allegations made by J Capital Research as I tend to stay away from allegations and instead choose to focus on the official SEC Filings and press releases. Of course that does not mean you shouldn’t look at every information available to you when researching a company. I just wont go into the J Capital Research in this post, but feel free to do so on your own accord. I apologize for the length of this post but i don’t like to leave too many stones unturned when researching a company, and i most certainly have missed something that may have proved useful in my research as i am one person and do not have a team working for me.

Disclosure: I am not a financial advisor, and I have not recommended any trades on Bit Digital (Nasdaq: BTBT) or any stock mentioned. I have not recommended to buy, sell, short, or buy options on Bit Digital or any stock mentioned. I am not defending any company or attacking any company. I do not have any open positions in Bit Digital and I never have had positions in Bit Digital prior to making this post. No one has paid me to make this post or any previous post of mine. I will never accept money to make a post for someone. I've been researching companies for a while now and only recently has it struck me that i should turn my research into a post for others to discuss, agree, disagree, dispute, correct information, etc. This post was me going into researching Bit Digital as a potential investor and posting some concerns of mine that I found. I do not stand to gain any financial benefit from Bit Digital share price increasing or decreasing. All that was discussed in this post was publicly available information. Please do your own research. Use the resources i link in the comments below to check everything i quote in my post.


A Detailed DD on Bit Digital (Formerly known as Golden Bull) (NASDAQ:BTBT)

Note: "Golden Bull Limited" changed their name to "Bit Digital" in September 2020. Again, "Golden Bull Limited" changed their company name to "Bit Digital" in September 2020.

The “JOBS” act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) was signed into law on April 5th, 2012 by the U.S. President Barack Obama. What is the "JOBS'' act? Well the "JOBS" act is a piece of american legislation that makes it easier for small businesses and companies to offer stock on american exchanges. The "JOBS'' act loosened regulations implemented by the SEC on companies and small businesses, such as lowering disclosure and reporting requirements if you’re a company that makes less than $1 billion in revenue. Essentially the goal of the "JOBS'' act was to make it easier for smaller companies to raise money and to allow "retail investors" to have the ability to invest in small businesses/ smaller startups. These small businesses/startups fell under a category called "emerging growth companies", which is a company that issues stock with a yearly revenue of less than $1 Billion. The "JOBS'' act loosened the reporting and oversight requirements for these "emerging growth companies". What I find most interesting about the "JOBS" act is the expansion of a rule called "Regulation A", which gave companies the ability to issue stock without having to go through the process of registering with the SEC. In the "JOBS '' act this rule was expanded, so companies can issue up to $50 million in stock annually without having to meet the regular SEC requirements. This was seen as a great thing because it opened up the opportunity for "retail investors'' to invest in "emerging growth companies". This opportunity would've only been available to "Accredited Investors'' had the "JOBS" act not been signed into law. But when you increase the chances for people to make money off investments, you also increase the chances for people to lose money off investments and now I want to segue to a company called Golden Bull Limited.

On March 20th, 2018, Golden Bull Limited filed their Prospectus with the SEC. In this, they announced an IPO of 1,550,000 shares at $4.00 a share. Also in this SEC Filing, they describe their business:

"We are an online finance marketplace, or “peer-to-peer” lending company, in China that provides borrowers access to short-term loans. The loans that we are currently arranging generally range from 30 days to 90 days, and are secured by borrowers’ automobiles. Through our online marketplace, we connect individual lenders with individual and small business borrowers. We currently conduct our business operations exclusively in China."

So they are a P2P money lending platform. They do not lend money to borrowers, they simply provide a marketplace to connect money lenders and borrowers. But what about if borrowers default on the loans lent to them by money lenders on the Golden Bull Limited platform? Well Golden Bull Limited said this:

"We currently facilitate loans exclusively to borrowers that provide an automobile as security to lenders..."

So Golden Bull Limited had the borrowers on their platform put up their car as collateral when receiving loans from money lenders. That sounds a bit too messy like how did Golden Bull Limited know the car wasn't stolen or recently been totaled or that borrowers weren't using stolen identities? These are some concerns i would’ve thought of when researching them but Golden Bull addresses this when they said,

"However, since none of the loans facilitated through our platform has defaulted to date, neither our collateralization standards nor our collection efforts have been tested in practice."

That sounds amazing. Considering Golden Bull Limited was in business for about 2.5 years up to the date of this statement ("From our inception in November 2015..."), no defaults on the loans of the borrowers who use their platform was a great sign and an enticing lure in their IPO. But one may raise some concerns about Golden Bull Limiteds' business model, such as what happens in the event of an economic crisis in China where money lending is decreased and borrowing demand is increased? (otherwise known as a credit crunch) What about the Chinese government potentially instituting tighter regulations on the practice of money lending? (this did eventually occur not long after their IPO) Considering China doesn't have a credit scoring system like the FICO system in the U.S., how do they know the probabilities of borrowers defaulting on loans? But all these concerns wouldn't even be addressing a big red flag with Golden Bull Limited. From the same SEC Filing (their Prospectus; links of my resources are down below in the comments), Golden Bull Limited discloses this:

"For the six months ended June 30, 2017, fees generated from loans provided to two borrowers accounted for 30.4% and 14.5% of our revenues, respectively."

So the most recent financial reporting given by Golden Bull up until their IPO on March 20th 2018, Golden Bull says that 45% of their total revenues came from the fees they collected from just two borrowers. So essentially two people who borrowed money on their platform (again, they didn’t borrow money from Golden Bull, Golden Bull simply was the middleman for the money lending and made revenue by collecting fees from each loan lent on their platform) contributed to 45% of their entire revenue. This revenue stream clearly wasn't sustainable, as these two borrowers could've left the Golden Bull platform for another platform, and Golden Bull would have their revenue nearly slashed in half (45%). So no surprise that Golden Bull Limited struggled to have a strong influence in the american stock market, but their share price never went below their IPO price of $4.00 until May 2019. From August 2019 to early April 2020, the stock of Golden Bull fell to as low as $0.28 a share and never went above $1.00 a share. If you see the chart of Golden Bull, you'll see that it had maintained a stock price movement between ~$3.00 and ~$10.00 a share over the course of early 2018 to mid 2019. But then they had a dramatic decrease in share price in August 2019 and the stock stayed below $1.00 a share for about another 8 months, with their all time low reaching $0.28. What was the catalyst for such sudden price movement downwards and the sustained low share price? Well...

On July 21st, 2019, Golden Bull Limited files a 6-k SEC Filing, in which they disclose this:

"Since May 2019, there have been a number of borrowers who borrowed funds via our online finance marketplace platform that maliciously defaulted on their debt repayment obligations (the “Defaulted Loans”)."

So the potential risks of the business model of Golden Bull came true and borrowers defaulted on their loans to the tune of "...(approximately USD13,500,000)".

That explains their stock plummeting in August 2019. But what was the reason for the stock staying under $1.00 for the next ~8 months? I’ll get to that later. But they also disclose something else in the same SEC Filing,

" ...we established Shanghai Youwang Vehicle Rental Limited...in order to start our car leasing business."

That's some positive news. Maybe Golden Bull can get into the car rental business after their p2p money lending platform just went up in flames.

"On July 1, 2019, the Chinese government implemented a new emission standard which requires vehicles to have better filtering systems. As such, our supplier may not be able to deliver the vehicles we purchased as previously scheduled. Management expects to launch the car leasing operations in the first quarter of 2020,. As of the date of this report, Shanghai Youwang has no substantive operations." (Date of SEC Filing: July 21st, 2019)

So essentially Golden Bull will not be making any sort of significant revenue until their car rental business launches in Q1 of 2020, which would've been about 5-7 months after the date of this SEC Filing (July 21st, 2019). So that perfectly explains the low share prices of Golden Bull from mid-2019 to mid 2020. But wait, there’s more.

In an 6-K SEC Filing Golden Bull filed on October 31st, 2019, they revealed that a Public Security Bureau (a government office in China that can be likened to a criminal law enforcement entity) in Shanghai finished their investigations into one of Golden Bull's subsidiary called "...Shanghai Dianniu Internet Finance Information Service Co., Ltd. (“Dianniu”)".

Dianniu was an arm of the Golden Bull company (Dianniu were in the business of “IoT”). In Golden Bulls' prospectus SEC Filing i discussed earlier it discloses 53% of Dianniu was owned by Xiaohui Liu (A top executive of Golden Bull), 21% owned by Zeng Erxin (the CEO of Golden Bull), 19% owned by Qian Lai Qian Wang Equity Investment Fund Management, and 7% owned by Huishi Equity Investment Fund Management. So these aforementioned entities, which consisted of the CEO (Erxin Zeng) and the Director (Xiaohui Liu) of Golden Bull, made up the owners of Dianniu. So now knowing the ownership structure of Dianniu, you'll understand that almost all of the management team of Golden Bull were charged with a criminal offense when a Public Security Bureau deemed Dianniu to have illegally collected public deposits.

"The Public Security Bureau has taken criminal enforcement measures against 17 suspects in this case, and have thus far detained 6 suspects. The Company’s management believes that the Company’s Chief Financial Officer, Jing Leng, and Director, Xiaohui Liu, as well as several members of Dianniu’s management may have been the subject of such criminal enforcement measures. The Public Security Bureau also has initiated online hunting for Mr. Erxin Zeng, CEO of the Company."

Essentially their entire executive and upper management team were suspected of committing acts illegal in the eyes of the Chinese law.

In an SEC Filing filed in November 2019, the new Management team of Golden Bull disclosed their intentions to enter into the crypto-mining business:

"The Company is planning to purchase bitcoin mining computers in December 2019 when funds are available."

But one hurdle Golden Bull would've had to get past was the fact that in April 2020, Golden Bull released their 2019 financial results. In this, Golden Bull reveals that they had less than $35,000 in cash and cash equivalents. If the new management team of Golden Bull purchased a significant amount of BTC-mining rigs in December 2019, that would severely impact Golden Bull financially as they ended 2019 with less than $35,000 in cash and cash equivalents.

So it's not looking great for Golden Bull. Their entire executive team was criminally charged by Chinese law enforcement or evading the capture of law enforcement. They now have to build up the company again from scratch. So what's their first order of business? Appoint a someone who they claim has expertise in the crypto/blockchain space to lead them into the crypto-mining space. Golden Bull appoints Mr. Huang as CFO (Chief Financial Officer) and gives him a seat on the board of directors. Mr. Huang is to be paid $60,000 annually and $100,000 annually for his employment of the aforementioned roles. Mr. Huang is said to have had expertise in the crypto space and has a good employment history in the financial/investment sector.

"Mr. Huang has served as the Co-Founder and Advisor of Long Soar Technology Limited since August 2019 and as the Founder/CEO of Bitotem Investment Management Limited since May 2018. From June 2016 to May 2018, Mr. Huang served as the Investment Manager of Guojin Capital. From August 2015 to May 2016, Mr. Huang served as an Analyst for Zhengshi Capital. Huang served as a Program Officer of Southwest Jiaotong University from February 2015 to August 2015. From March 2013 to November 2014, Mr. Huang served as the Engineering Analyst Team Leader of Crowncastle International. Mr. Huang received his bachelor’s degree in Environmental Engineering from Southwest Jiaotong University in 2011, and received his master’s degree in Civil & Environmental Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University in 2012."

So this seems like a step in the right direction for Golden Bull. So they have their CFO appointed, but what about their vacant CEO position?

Mr. Hu is appointed CEO and is to be paid $80,000 annually for his role as CEO and $100,000 annually for his role in being a part of the board of directors. What does Mr. Hu's employment history look like? Well... "Mr. Hu has served as the Business Manager of Weihua Liquor Company since 2011. From 2009 to 2011, Mr. Hu served as the General Manager of Xuejiawan Huafeng Wholesale Market Company. Mr. Hu served as a Manager of Eastern Hair Growth Center Company from 2002 to 2009. Mr. Hu received his bachelor’s degree in Law from Qingdao Qiushi College of Arts and Sciences in 2000."

Needless to say that is not an employment history of a CEO that instills confidence in me as a potential investor considering the company plans to move into the crypto-mining space. In the aftermath of the near self-destruction of Golden Bull, the Nasdaq halted trading of Golden Bull Limited stock. This was due to the mess of a company that Golden Bull was at that moment in time and was also due to the delay from Golden Bull in reporting their 2019 financial results. This Nasdaq trading halt wasn't lifted until April 2020, when Golden Bull released their 2019 financial results.

Despite all this, Golden Bull was still funding their crypto-mining operations. A quote from one article who discusses Golden Bull raises concerns about the future of their company: "...but only $35k in the bank as of 1/1/20 and no ability to generate cash flow with its car rental business (per today's filing), we are left to wonder how this business is being funded. I am also curious to know if the company has had any contact with the executives that were fired in October, the two people who own 58% of the company's stock."

In January 2021, J Capital Research issued a scathing report on Bit Digital (previously Golden Bull), where they allege that Bit Digital does not have the miners they claim they do and J Capital Research also allege that they spoke with the sellers of the mining rigs that Bit Digital claimed they bought their mining rigs from and they say that the sellers had never done any business with Bit Digital. There are a lot of other allegations made by J Capital in their report which i won't be getting into as they are currently only allegations. Bit Digital has refuted the allegations brought by J Capital Research and today I will stick to combing through SEC Filings and articles in my research of Bit Digital (formerly Golden Bull).

Bit Digital (formerly Golden Bull) has 40,865 miners and has mined 1,510.19 Bitcoin (According to their own website as of February 21st, 2021).

Summary of my research: The history of Bit Digital (formerly known as Golden Bull) is an interesting one and showed some of the same red flags that I have found in researching several companies that were similar to Golden Bull. Golden Bull Limited was a P2P Money lending platform operating in China that provided borrowers and money lenders with a marketplace to issue loans. Golden Bull Limited connected money lenders with borrowers, and made revenue by collecting fees off of the loans being transacted on their platform. Up until their IPO, Golden Bull disclosed that they did not have any users on their platform default on the loans they were lent. 45% of their total revenue from a six month period ending June 2017 came from the fees they collected from just two borrowers. (Note: China does not have a credit scoring system like the FICO scoring system in the U.S.) Golden Bull had their IPO in March of 2018 and had a stable share price movement up until August of 2019, when it was revealed that borrowers had started defaulting on their loans en masse. (Note: Golden Bull was not a money lender or a borrower. They were simply the platform in which money lenders and borrowers transacted. But when many borrowers on their platform start to default on their loans in a short amount of time, their revenue stream gets impacted severely as they make money off the fees of the loans being lent on their platform. Less revenue leads to a increased inability to cover operating expenses, which leads to more headwinds) The share price of Golden Bull plummeted to less than $1.00 a share and the company revealed even worse news in an SEC Filing filed by Golden Bull on October 31st, 2019 where they disclose that on the 24th of October 2019, a Chinese law enforcement agency had suspected all of Golden Bull upper management of illegally collecting public deposits through a subsidiary of Golden Bull called Dianniu. The CEO of Golden Bull Erxin Zeng, who had a 21% stake in Dianniu, had gone on the run and initially evaded the capture of the Chinese law enforcement agency. Money lenders who had their loans defaulted on by borrowers on the Golden Bull platform and couldn’t receive the collateral that borrowers supposedly were required to post (the collateral that borrowers were required to post was their car) sued Dianniu in an effort to get recover their defaulted loans. In the aftermath, all of the executives of Golden Bull were arrested and jailed for their involvement in the illegal activities of illegally collecting public deposits. Needing to fill the vacancies of the executive team, Golden Bull appointed a new CFO, who had experience in the finance/investing sector. But their appointment of the new CEO was not an inspiring one, as his employment history consisted of this:

“Mr. Hu has served as the Business Manager of Weihua Liquor Company since 2011. From 2009 to 2011, Mr. Hu served as the General Manager of Xuejiawan Huafeng Wholesale Market Company. Mr. Hu served as a Manager of Eastern Hair Growth Center Company from 2002 to 2009. Mr. Hu received his bachelor’s degree in Law from Qingdao Qiushi College of Arts and Sciences in 2000.”

When you consider that Golden Bull wanted to enter the crypto-mining space but their cash and cash equivalents on their balance sheet ending January 1st 2020 was $35,000, and they couldn’t generate any cash flow from their only proposed business (that being the car rental business) and their newly appointed CEO in November 2019 had no expertise in the cryptocurrency/blockchain space, then you’ll see the concerns i had/ still have as a potential investor in Bit Digital. In July 2020, Golden Bull “...completed the sale of 21,500,000 shares of common stock at $0.80 per share, for gross proceeds of $17,200,000.” So Bit Digital raised over $17,000,000 (which was used to finance their crypto-mining venture) by issuing more stock, which dilutes shareholders but its a better alternative than taking on debt to raise capital and issuing additional stock is a common occurrence among low-cap companies (Golden Bull changed their name in September 2020 to Bit Digital). When I look into a company, I try to delve deep into their past and Bit Digital's past is not pretty. But some recent developments in Bit Digital is that in early February the CEO of Bit Digital was removed by the board of directors (the same board that the CEO sat on), and a board member stepped down from their position in the board of directors. Here is a quote from an article announcing the news: “Bit Digital (BTBT), which has been battling allegations of fraud, said its board of directors has removed Min Hu as CEO. The bitcoin mining company also said Ping Liu resigned as chairwoman of the board due to “health reasons.”

Bit Digital is also facing a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. Southern District Court of New York on January 22nd, 2021, which “...allege the mining company made false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose the true extent of its mining operations, which it said had 22,869 bitcoin machines in China, per the filing.”

As of the making of this post, 2/21/21, Bit Digital says it has 40,865 Bitcoin miners which have mined 1,510.19 Bitcoin. I am not interested in delving into the allegations made by J Capital Research as I tend to stay away from allegations and instead choose to focus on the official SEC Filings and press releases. Of course that does not mean you shouldn’t look at every information available to you when researching a company. I just wont go into the J Capital Research in this post, but feel free to do so on your own accord. I apologize for the length of this post but i don’t like to leave too many stones unturned when researching a company, and i most certainly have missed something that may have proved useful in my research as i am one person and do not have a team working for me.

Disclosure: I am not a financial advisor, and I have not recommended any trades on Bit Digital (Nasdaq: BTBT) or any stock mentioned. I have not recommended to buy, sell, short, or buy options on Bit Digital or any stock mentioned. I am not defending any company or attacking any company. I do not have any open positions in Bit Digital and I never have had positions in Bit Digital prior to making this post. No one has paid me to make this post or any previous post of mine. I will never accept money to make a post for someone. I've been researching companies for a while now and only recently has it struck me that i should turn my research into a post for others to discuss, agree, disagree, dispute, correct information, etc. This post was me going into researching Bit Digital as a potential investor and posting some concerns of mine that I found. I do not stand to gain any financial benefit from Bit Digital share price increasing or decreasing. All that was discussed in this post was publicly available information. Please do your own research. Use the resources i link in the comments below to check everything i quote in my post.


Bitcoin - The Quadrillion Dollar Asset

Bitcoin (or Ethereum) is going to be the first single asset to reach a quadrillion dollar marketcap (in $USD terms), you heard it here first.

1 billion = 1000 millions

1 trillion = 1000 billions

1 quadrillion = 1000 trillions

At 1 quadrillion dollars market cap, it will have an implied price of about $47,620,000.00 per BTC.

That said, it's nothing to be happy or to be proud of, 1 quadrillion US dollars may sound like a lot, but when bitcoin gets there, the purchasing power of the US dollar has probably dwindled so much that the rise of bitcoin is merely just a preservation of your purchasing power. I know it's sad, but it's the direction that we're heading to.

What we've learned so far is that there's nothing impossible when it comes to bitcoin, honey badger does whatever it wants. And I've only realized this after a life changing event recently.

I'm saying this from a hodler's perspective since 2016 (before the 2nd bitcoin halving).


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Understanding Fintech: An Essay on my Investment in Square

Purpose

The purpose of this post is to write out the thought process and analysis of some of my major investments. Each of these investments can take over a year to decide on, but cannot be invested in until I have written out the process.

Part of this is also due to the fact that I believe that investing in securities will become increasingly complex yet accessible for a typical retail investor which will either result in isolation OR incentivize cooperation to open-source complex information.

  • Does the average retail investor really understand the core regulatory influences in investments like Square, PayPal, or even RH?

  • Does the average retail investor understand incentives vs. bias?

  • Is the average retail investor familiar with fashion trends that make Nike and Foot Locker valuable?

  • Is an average retail investor familiar with competitive types of manufacturing processes when they invest in technologies like AMD or GE?

  • Is the average retail investor familiar with the network models that govern software like Fastly and Twilio?

At the end of the day, I am an educator and I believe that the goal of education is to engage a reader into a deeper curiosity or discussion, so that’s why I’m sharing my writing. I’m not here to convince you that this stock is even a good choice - but to explore the economics behind it.

The Fundamental Constraint

This one is not going to be easy to understand, so get your coffee ready and get comfortable. It’s going to be difficult to digest the technology behind Square because it asks you to believe the premise that banking is going to change in unforeseeable ways in the near future. I currently work in the Banking-as-a-Service sector as an engineer, so I have some insight that I could offer.

A fair amount of people may not know this, but organizations like Stripe, Square, PayPal, and other fintech infrastructures are just network layers over existing banks. For example, Stripe partners with Evolve Bank while Square partners with Sutton Bank. This is a win-win scenario, for now, where banks get to see the benefits of technology distribution powers, while tech companies gain a shortcut to regulatory requirements.

It may help to accept this by understanding the idea that drives the financial technology sector. In order to distribute financial services to people, regardless of net worth, trustworthiness and accountability must be established. These are regulatory frameworks developed by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) that are also challenged by such technologies like B*tcoin, where validation is arbitrary and based on fingerprinting. This trustworthiness is also the reason why you’re able to instantly invest in your RH account - you are a trusted user and there is no reason to believe that you are somebody else.

It is, then, no secret as to why Square invested in B*tcoin. There are other reasons, even cultural, as to why they did, but the basic root behind the decision is that it allows research into new verification methods that makes shipping financial services even more frictionless. It is a potential vector for changing the rules of the game and leveling the playing field, so to speak. Being a software-first bank allows you to distribute at a much more rapid pace than a traditional large bank.

In short, The fuel of fintech is the underbanked. The combustion engine that burns it is cybersecurity and AI to validate that a user is trustworthy each time they commit a transaction. This is known as the KYC Problem and how each organization approaches the regulatory requirement to verify that a user is not committing fraud will determine the outcome of who dominates the fintech sector. This is also why you see customer-service as a pervasive problem.

Now let me just go ahead and take the opinion here - I don’t think PayPal will achieve this in the US, but their investment in MercadoLibre might take them there in some way. Latin America is a particularly interesting case study in underbanking. The reason I hate this is because I feel that a lot of their services are disconnected and low-quality. For example, Remitly allows me to send money to Mexico in a highly informed and smooth way, while Xoom (a paypal remittance service) just about shits the bed the moment I touch it. Sure, that’s anecdote - but I want my investments going somewhere where the design is ALWAYS built around the customer. PayPal’s management resulting in the shipment of an unfinished and thoughtless product is just an awful red flag to me. I should not be getting unknown error alert when I send money to another country.

The Underbanked

Jack Dorsey is an interesting character, who views on technology can be highlighted:

> “...to develop an open and decentralized standard for social media. The goal is for Twitter to ultimately be a client of this standard. Twitter was so open early on that many saw its potential to be a decentralized internet standard, like SMTP (email protocol). For a variety of reasons, all reasonable at the time, we took a different path and increasingly centralized Twitter. But a lot’s changed over the years.”

Interestingly enough, Twitter is used in such a manner. The Tweet system these days gets shared across all social media platforms due to its simple design and even appears interactively during sporting events or billboards.

In my view, Jack Dorsey sees the current period of time as a turning point in internet communications and the underbanked. It is clear as day in its marketing strategy, where Square seller services is marketed strongly toward immigrants and first-time entrepreneurs while Cash App is strongly marketed toward young, first-time banking customers. No really, go ahead and look at two things:

  • Cash App’s Twitter and advertising strategy
  • The geographic results on Google Trends when searching “Cash App vs. Venmo”. Southern USA generally sees less banking due to increased poverty.

It is clear as day and the reason is due to the nature of the demographics of underbanked users. You see, access to banking is not much different than access to the internet or access to clean water. That is, the closer you are to poverty, the closer you are to lacking access to basic resources. What is interesting about Square’s youth & culture strategy is that it builds a life-long trust with the org. You’ve heard it before, “why doesn’t school teach us important thing like taxes or investing?”. Square is attacking that pulse in its design. It offers:

  1. The ability to start a business
  2. The ability to invest and educate in basic stocks
  3. The ability to invest and educate in bitcoin
  4. The ability to save on basic purchases
  5. The ability to file taxes (not yet, but the company acquired the means to)

What this inevitably means is that we probably won’t even see Square operating at “full-force” until at least 2030 and beyond, as these early aged customers grow with Square and embed more of their financials.

Speculation

This is what I expect after examining regulatory environments, product quality, and competitive outlooks:

  1. Square will either acquire Sutton Bank or reduce its dependency on Sutton Bank’s regulatory offerings.
  2. Square will become a bank to avoid direct competition with Big Tech, while competing aggressively against Big Banking by offering the ability to ship financial services.
  3. The way they will achieve this is by developing a stronger form of cybersecurity and AI that will allow a smoother verification process.
  4. Square will develop an internet railway, where exchanging currency will be accessible in different mediums like video-games or streams that may compete with orgs like Visa or MasterCard.
  5. Square will compete with Banking-as-a-service and checkout offerings like Stripe, Plaid, and Shopify.

Pls folllw.

https://i.pcmag.com/imagery/reviews/06hGKT6YUeRY99vz4MVPPh0-7..1569477220.jpg


Anonymous Gold the Navcoin store of value NAV/xNAV

In 2021 the Navcoin community accidentally created the future of Cryptocurrency. Within a few short years the little know crypto currency known as Navcoin that came into existence in 2014 in the early stages of the Navcoin revolution. At the start of 2021 it ranked lowly as one of the top 500 currencies but by the end of that year had surpassed all competitors with its unbeatable combination of a store of value that was not only a great investment on its own but also paid interest at up to 5% for NAV (the public block chain store of value crypto currency) or paid significant mixing rewards for xNAV the anonymous version known as the anonymous gold standard.

What accidentally shot Navcoin into the lime light was a single accidental transaction, or one carefully orchestrated by the community, no one really knows how it happened, on the transactional version of Navcoin, the currency rather than a store of value, wNav that spanned operational use across BEP-20 and ERC-20 platforms. wNAV was initially released with a 1:1000000 conversion rate between NAV or xNAV and wNAV. A transaction occurred on a distributed exchange for the currently active NAV or xNAV exchange rate of 0.89 cents on the wNAV token rather than the effective rate at the time of 0.00000089. Prior to this it was vaguely recognised that wNAV had one of the largest circulating supplies of all crypto currencies and tokens with a circulating supply of over 71 Trillion coins. This automatically sent the price of NAV to over $890000 dollars and gave NAV a market capitalisation of over 63 Trillion dollars making it the most expensive individual asset class the world had ever seen and exceeded the market capitalisation of the entire US stock market at the time. This sent arbitrage platforms into a spin creating a massive readjustment of market capitalisations across the entire crypto currency industry. The ripple effects are still felt to this day many years on from this event. It would take many years to return to these levels. Having shot into the spotlight and been recognised as having the lowest transaction fees available, low inflation, built in support for anonymity and a coin supply capable of making it the currency of the world and utility not seen in anything before it, these features made it the clear winner from the start of the Navcoin currency revolution and the blockchain platform the has taken Navcoin to be the blockchain of choice across all industries, the gold standard of the revolution it created.

So is this possible, probably not, but can it happen if NAV, xNAV and wNAV are treated with equal value and can Navcoin take its natural place based on its tech as a top tier crypto currency. It can and will we just have to make it happen as a community, support the core dev team and build the other core support teams that need to be in place to make it happen. Although a hypothetical scenario that would be good for anyone holding even a small amount of Navcoin it highlights a few issues for us to get to where we want to be.

We are a top 400 alt currency and was a top 500 alt currency not too long ago. There are over 480 alt currencies with a market capitalisation that exceeds Navcoin. This means we are not significant, we do not get noticed and even the best of tech gets lost in the noise of the 480 coins with a higher market capitalisation. Is this where we want to be and is this where we want to sit. Does xNAV improve the situation, well yes it did we moved from the low 500s to the high 400s but in reality we pretty much sit where we were in the hierarchy of the crypto world.

It is going to take some luck to get where we want to be. Someone tweets about Navcoin, something happens to a higher ranked competitor or a massive DAO driven marketing campaign brings us into the spotlight. Nobody disputes the tech that Navcoin has but how does anybody know about it?

Markets do not always behave rationally and when they are not fundamentals have little importance at that time. Of course those fundamentals determine where we sit when things settle down but our market capitalisation is not based on tech. The market capitalisation is based on the tech we are going to have, what we stand for and what we are perceived to be or how we are determined to be placed in 1 month, 1 year, 5 years or 20 years into the future.

So NAV represents a staking currency that basically earns a rate of interest based on our proof of stake model. It therefore naturally aligned to operating as a store of value rather than a currency but with the advantages of its roots as a crypto currency. xNAV represents an anonymous currency that can earn revenue by generation of mixing fees. wNAV represents a token of exchange with the purpose of integrating into the larger distributed finance eco system. On this basis NAV represents a store of value similar to how Bitcoin is used now with a high value and high transaction fees but earns interest as well as increasing in value over time. xNAV represents a unique store of value that is anonymous has a high value but is expensive to use but also is a great store of value with mixing fee generated stored xNAV. So wNAV is a low value, agile, low cost token of exchange and as such is representative of NAV and xNAV in a ratio of 1:10, 1:100, 1:1000 or even 1:10000. On its own wNAV does not represent a multiple of NAV or xNAV we have to decide this is how we want wNAV to be perceived and this is how we want NAV and xNAV to be perceived. If we do not believe in this ourselves then why would someone else.

The main purpose of the changes I am proposing is that the community fund be allocated significant funds with the intention of assisting the core dev team in the work it does. There are a few concerns about the community fund that I did not have going into this. There appears to be some thought that the community fund has approved scams and wasted funds on things and that is on us as a community and not a fault of the community fund. There a reasonable population of the community that believes the community fund has all these funds sitting there and no one is using them and that is not the fault of the community fund that is also on us as a community. If we do not take responsibility for this then the failure is because of us as a community and the concept of DAO is a failure. We have to make this work better and as a developer myself, although not a Navcoin developer, all of this is not a natural position that sits well with me but I recognise there is a need for change, a lot of the opinions are based on technical fundamentals and market fundamentals and although these are important their importance is not black and white.

So what would the community fund need 1 million NAV for when it can't even use what it has let alone 50 million NAV and as it operates now it does not. Token Sale $144,630,000 RECEIVED Polkadot (DOT) was one of the largest ICOs of the time. Specifically, the company secured around $145 million. This hack resulted in a combined loss of around 150 million USD. Sadly, Polkadot’s ICO funding accounted for around 60% of the funds frozen during the hack. This loss of funding slowed development during the early days of the project. Just as one example, maybe a good one but they had their ups and downs to. They started out with $145M and I have suggested 50 million NAV that equates at the moment to around $25M. We have done something similar with no ICO and a community which is a fantastic thing but we are competing with well funded entities with corporate structures which has advantages but many disadvantages in crypto. So summed up the community fund as it stands does not need any additional funds. The community fund of the future needs significant fund for Navcoin to stop hiding behind its great tech and build better tech, a bigger community and a community fund and DAO that is the envy of every project. It should be a shining model of how DAO operates.

So there are a few issues with DAO beyond the community fund. There is no one person responsible for or representative of Navcoin. In the real world this presents a problem as you cannot register a website as you need a real person, you cannot pay someone legally in most countries as you need a person or corporate structure and cannot get funding or have a bank account. These issues have not presented a problem for Navcoin to this point as community members have put their names to things, paid for things and represented Navcoin as a DAO. This makes it difficult to utilise the community funds in a traditional way. So it means we needs to find entities that will accept payment in NAV and payments for any work on Navcoin has to occur in NAV and by improving the utility of Navcoin it does not solve these issues.

The DAO is operating at a high level as it should and the core dev team has built xNAV and working on wNAV without any decisions via DAO. The work was done and the decision to move to xNAV was voted by installing 6.0. I believe that is how it should be but the question is if this went to a vote via DAO and took weeks to make a decision would we be where we are now, we would I believe but it would be later in the year. So this highlights the issue of DAO it needs to make the high level decisions but leave the decisions as to how we get there to the core team responsible for it. The core team should not be the core dev team it should be made up of all the functions required to operate a first rate crypto currency. We have the great minds of the core dev team making day to day decisions but they do so without the support structures to do what they do best. So the question is do we want to continue as it is or build that support structure around the core of Navcoin which is the core dev team. The community has a part to play and is assisting but not at a level to make us the first class project that we can be when we compare our operations with those we aspire to be ahead of in the crypto currency race.

Cryto currency is still at the beginning and Bitcoin is king now but no one is watching while we are positioned where we are. Lets use what we have to make Navcoin the future of crypto currency gold with NAV and anonymous gold in xNAV as stores of values with the utility of currency with low fees and coin supply like wNAV. Take DAO and the community fund to the next level and build the platform of distributed finance that nobody but the Navcoin community saw coming. Take note of some of the comments that come from beyond our community and we generally consider spam but some of them have a grain of truth, most probably not the case, and we should not be concerned about this but should reflect on them as we are in a bubble and we need to look beyond the bubble of Navcoin.

On the basis of the above I will modify my consultation to include an option for a xNAV/NAV to wNAV swap ratio of 1:100, 1:1000. I have nothing against the idea of 1:10 or 1:10000 but I am not comfortable with 1:10 and see 1:10000 as hard to accept given the community I know and love! If this were to occur NAV and xNAV would be treated as if it were to become a store of value longer term and the need to change the reward or community fund percentage would be irrelevant.

The consensus parameter changes for amount of NAV per block as 10 remains and although there are concerns about inflation I still fail to see the issue with xNAV and wNAV. If this occurred on its own without the proposed changes to the community fund I believe there would be more community support. This change should not occur if NAV is intended to operate as a store of value in the future as the aim would be to minimise inflation rather than increase it.

The consensus parameter change to the community fund percentage surprised me. I believe the community fund used effectively is a valuable part of a better DAO. I do not believe there is currently support for improving the financial position of the community fund but I could be proven wrong. I tend to agree we may not deserve a bigger better community fund until we have proven we can make the best use of what we already have. But beyond how it has been used it would be important to make Navcoin a forced to be reckoned with and we may only get to that point if the value of NAV/xNAV and wNAV have significant value. Regardless of how we might get there or not the community fund needs to be better utilised.

https://www.reddit.com/r/NavCoin/comments/lovf8e/10_nav_per_stake_50_community_fund_proposed/

https://www.reddit.com/r/NavCoin/comments/loxcb2/10_nav_per_stake_50_community_fund_target_top_100/


Theoretical Tax Question

I have yet to enter the crypto space but was curious how the taxation works. If I buy 500 dollars worth of Bitcoin and never sell it I technically don’t owe money until I realize again. However, let’s say I buy 500 with of Bitcoin and exchange it for another coin. Is that a taxable event? If so, how do you even go about reporting it?


Crypto History Logs - 2014 Mt. Gox Collapse

The records will show that Mt. Gox officially halted all withdrawals on the morning of 7th February 2014. But for those who held Bitcoin in the early years, everyone was aware that things were going terribly wrong in Mt. Gox.

I write this to open a window into the past for many of the newcomers, and also to provide interesting content for those who want to know the history of the wild west of crypto.

Bitcoin had surged in the previous year, 2013, from a low of $13 in January to $1100 by the end of the year. This was driven primarily by, you could have guessed it, China. At the time China's government had been cracking down on capital outflows, and Bitcoin was still relatively new and untouched by Chinese law.

"The demand out of China has been pretty staggering," said Barry Silbert, founder and CEO of SecondMarket, the parent company of Bitcoin Investment Trust, which was recently launched as the first U.S.-based investment fund dedicated just to Bitcoin.

"We're seeing the early signs of money coming into Bitcoin as an asset class," Silbert said.

- CNN Article, 12th November 2013

Although China's volume had overtaken Mt. Gox in the dramatic run up to $1100, the Western world, including Reddit at the time, were trading almost the entirety of volume on Bitstamp and the ill-fated Mt. Gox exchange.

It wasn't all bad decisions that gave Mt. Gox its reputation, they did have a number of excuses that they tried to fall back on: in the same month of May 2013, U.S. Feds seized Mt. Gox's primary bank account and CoinLabs filed a lawsuit for $75 million.

Mark Karpeles, the infamous owner of Mt. Gox, was forced to suspend fiat withdrawals to all U.S. bank accounts. In fact, the Bitcoin volume chart clearly shows that it was this moment, not February 2014, that marked the beginning of the end for Mt. Gox. Rumors circulated for the entire year of the exchange's solvency, and for several months statements were regularly made reassuring the public that withdrawals would be working soon.

Few users of the exchange ever got their withdrawals completed.

Around this time, Roger Ver had also come rushing to Mt. Gox's defence. In July 2013, he recorded the infamous "hostage" video where he defends Mark Karpeles while reading from a script as if he were forced to do so. This did not help the situation at all, as many felt emboldened to keep using the exchange due to Roger's testimony. Keep in mind, deposits in both crypto and fiat were kept open throughout this entire saga.

If this wasn't bad enough for Bitcoin's price action, the following came completely out of left field:

5th December 2013 - China bans banks from handling Bitcoin trade.

The first, and definitely not last, China FUD. All the momentum Bitcoin had running up to $1100 had come to a screeching halt.

Over the next 3 days, Bitcoin dropped by a staggering 40%.

Many of you know what happened next.

7th February 2014 - Mt. Gox halts all withdrawals.

23rd February 2014 - Mark Karpeles resigns from the Bitcoin Foundation.

24th February 2014 - Mt. Gox goes completely offline. An internal document is leaked stating:

At this point 744,408 BTC are missing due to malleability-related theft which went unnoticed for several years.

The cold storage has been wiped out due to a leak in the hot wallet. The reality is that Mt Gox can go bankrupt at any moment, and certainly deserves to as a company.

A black swan event is bad enough.

Two of them?

That set in motion a 3 year bear market... Until 2017.

P.S. Mark Karpeles ended up spending only 12 months in jail in Japan. He was later found guilty of falsifying important data, but was given a suspended sentence.

P.P.S. Japanese bankruptcy court is still dealing with the fallout of the company's collapse, 7 years later.

End log.